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RESEARCH & DEBATE

“GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA”
WHAT ANALYSIS IS REQUIRED TO COMPEL A NEW U.S. STRATEGY IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA?

Steven Stashwick

China’s extensive island-building projects in the Spratly Islands, the aggressive
harassment tactics of its maritime law-enforcement and paramilitary fleets, and
its rejection of binding arbitration rulings on both those activities threaten the
rules-based international order and pose political, economic, and potentially
military threats to U.S. interests in the region. In “Getting Serious about Strategy
in the South China Sea,” from the Winter 2018 Naval War College Review, Hal
Brands and Zack Cooper make an important contribution to the debate on how
the United States should respond to China’s challenge in the South China Sea.1
However, because their argument in favor of finding a new strategy is isolated
from the identified consequences that such new strategies would have on other
policies, their analysis falls short of providing a compelling argument for the
United States to pursue a substantially different South China Sea strategy.
Citing muddled and confused U.S. policies to date, Brands and Cooper systematically evaluate four broad strategies for a U.S. response, as well as the costs
and hazards associated with each. Ultimately, they
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the latter is necessary to change the incumbent policy hierarchy and defaults.
If such a reordering is self-evident to proponents of more-assertive policies, it
demonstrably is not to decision-making authorities, and “Getting Serious” is
unlikely to change that.
While their analysis admirably defines a universe of strategy options for the
United States, Brands and Cooper do not provide a systematic way to evaluate the
trade-offs they identify between the four strategies and other U.S. policy priorities. Without such a framework for comparing the value of a strategy’s expected
benefits with the expected damage it would impose on other policy priorities, it
is difficult to evaluate the merits of those trade-offs. The result is that the authors’
own strategy-selection criteria appear more subjective than systematic. Neither
is it clear, in any case, that Brands and Cooper’s recommended hybrid strategy
would be substantially different in execution from the strategy that emerged
under President Obama and appears to be consolidating under President Trump.
Brands and Cooper present a compelling list of U.S. strategic interests in
the South China Sea: the free flow of more than three trillion dollars in trade
each year; the natural resources that regional states harvest and extract; the
military-access challenge posed to U.S. forces by China’s island bases in the
event of an armed conflict; regional stability and what is sometimes called the
international rules-based order; and, more broadly, regional states’ ultimate
choice to align and cooperate more with the United States than with China.3 The
authors implicitly argue that America’s defense of these interests is incoherent
and confused owing to a lack of systematic thinking about its strategic options,
the priority objectives it should seek, and acceptable levels of risk in pursuit
of those objectives. Their subsequent analysis evaluates four strategies for the
United States: (1) rollback—to dislodge China coercively from its artificial island
bases, (2) containment—to prevent China’s occupation or reclamation of additional geographic features, (3) offset—to match China’s military advances in
the region with additional military capacity and capabilities of its own, and (4)
accommodation—to acquiesce deliberately to China’s regional dominance.
However, advocating a change in U.S. South China Sea policy (or any policy)
requires an affirmative and compelling argument for decision makers to accept
additional risks to other policy interests in exchange for the expected benefits of a
new course of action. Unfortunately, while Brands and Cooper consider the negative impact of each strategy on other U.S. policy priorities, such as armed-conflict
avoidance, fairness in trade relations, and cooperation on climate change and
North Korea’s nuclear program, and effects on other regional partners, they do
not suggest how to place a value on those hazards. As a result, while a reader gains
insight into why the South China Sea matters on its own terms, it is not clear why,
or even whether, it matters enough to accept new risks to those other priorities
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/9
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in the U.S.-China relationship or to other regional partner relationships. Today,
U.S. South China Sea policies already are effectively subordinated to these other
interests. By not providing an affirmative argument to reorder those strategic
priorities, Brands and Cooper implicitly endorse the current strategic hierarchy,
thereby undercutting their assertion that the United States should accept greater
risk in the region.
Without such a prioritization framework, Brands and Cooper’s recommended
hybrid containment-offset strategy appears compelling less for its departures
from existing policies than its similarities. The authors argue that the United
States should contain China’s ambitions to seize any additional geographic
features in the South China Sea or to embark on renewed island reclamation.
However, since containment would not prevent China from reinforcing its existing South China Sea bases (and might even encourage it), the United States also
should seek to offset any such military advances with enhancements to its own
regional military posture. Yet if this approach is intuitively attractive, it is unclear
how new or substantively different it is from what the United States is pursuing
already.
Their case for containment rests largely on its demonstrable efficacy in previous isolated containment efforts the United States has implemented to prevent
China from occupying or reclaiming additional features in the South China Sea.4
But if Brands and Cooper’s criticism is that U.S. containment efforts have been
only episodic, they elide that China’s recent expansion efforts have been similarly
isolated and episodic. Arguing that U.S. containment now should be more comprehensive seems a distinction with little practical difference, as China has not
occupied or reclaimed successfully any additional features beyond the original
seven Spratly features it reclaimed and built up after 2013.5
In arguing for the offset component of their recommendation, Brands and
Cooper do not differentiate meaningfully their version from the global Third
Offset policy enacted by the Obama Pentagon and the pivot/rebalance to Asia
to counter, in no small part, rising Chinese capabilities.6 While the Trump administration may have abandoned the “offset” name, it does not appear to have
abandoned the underlying policies or acquisition goals, and its subsequently
published strategies make commitment to responding to great-power competition explicit.7 Thus, while Brands and Cooper perhaps have helped clarify the
terms and vocabulary of debate for a U.S. South China Sea strategy, they seem
substantively to be advocating for the policy status quo. If U.S. policy has appeared confused or muddled, this is perhaps attributable less to a lack of analytic
rigor than to issues of execution and the complexity of translating written policy
into real-world effects.
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Granted, the ultimate choice of strategy rests with U.S. political leadership, as
do decisions about how to order U.S. policy priorities when they conflict. Brands
and Cooper recognize this, which perhaps accounts for choosing not to address
how to order the strategic priorities within the scope of their argument. But if the
prioritization of one policy area over another is a political choice, it need not be
a subjective one. Since the publication of their article, the Trump administration
has published its National Security Strategy (NSS), which signals greater focus
on China’s strategic competition generally, and singles out the threat of China’s
island construction in the South China Sea specifically. However, the NSS does
not assign any specific political or military means for addressing the South China
Sea, nor does it provide a hierarchy of U.S. interests vis-à-vis China to assist in
evaluating policy trade-offs.8
As Brands and Cooper assert, the free flow of trade, military access, and the
rules-based order are important U.S. interests in the South China Sea. However,
those interests are not generally self-evidently more or less important than other
aspects of the U.S.-China relationship or other regional interests that would be
hazarded by a new South China Sea policy. Since the Trump NSS does not provide an explicit hierarchy of those interests, it privileges the de facto hierarchy
that deprioritizes the South China Sea today. At the same time, it does not prescribe such a hierarchy by policy guidance, leaving the door open to those who
might advocate for elevating the South China Sea’s importance. However, without
demonstrating why preferred strategies will not affect other priorities adversely
or why South China Sea objectives are sufficiently more important to hazard
them, Brands and Cooper’s analysis is insufficient to compel such a change in
South China Sea strategy.
Nonetheless, Brands and Cooper’s preferred hybrid strategy does suggest a research need and a potential policy opportunity. The authors admit that the hybrid
strategy would not prevent additional militarization on the features China already occupies. This weakness is mitigated by the offset component, which would
in theory match—or, rather, offset—any new Chinese capability in the region
with additional U.S. and partner capabilities. But an offset strategy also effectively
commits the United States to an arms race with China in a region where the latter
enjoys advantages of economic ascendancy; geographic proximity; and the ability
to concentrate forces more easily, given its fewer geographically diffuse security
demands. The implication is that an offset strategy is more likely than not to exacerbate the security dilemma between the two competitors—a vexing problem
the authors identify but leave unexplored. This recommends research into policy
options to halt or limit further militarization of China’s occupied features in the
Spratly Islands, with a specific objective of preventing either permanent or rotational deployment of the force-projection capabilities those islands by now have
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/9
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been built up to host. Such a policy course most likely would entail a bargain or
implicit agreement, but—unlike the authors’ accommodation strategy—would
require maintaining some form of leverage or inducement to ensure compliance.
Such a course falls under a family of policies, such as confidence-building
measures, crisis-management tools, arms control, and international law and
institutions, that the United States and other Southeast Asian powers already
pursue on an ad hoc basis or as supporting policies of the four strategies Brands
and Cooper evaluate. But instead of considering these as policies intended only to
mitigate the risks of those broad strategies, their systematic pursuit might constitute a fifth strategy option; call it risk attenuation. Like Brands and Cooper’s hybrid strategy, it is largely a defense of the strategic status quo in the South China
Sea. Such a course would not abandon the role of military balancing and suasion,
but would privilege the prevention of armed conflict as an affirmative objective.
A risk-attenuation strategy may be criticized as Pollyannaish or naive by advocates of assertive versions of containment or offset policies, but such a strategy
recognizes the constraint that those advocates thus far have failed to surmount,
which is to offer decision makers a compelling argument to change the incumbent hierarchy of China policy priorities and accept the additional risk of armed
conflict that their preferred strategies incur. To that end, a comprehensive comparison of those relevant strategic trade-offs is a worthy, if daunting, analytic
endeavor. However, advocates of stronger South China Sea policies must be prepared that a systematic comparison of those priorities may not yield the compelling justification to change the status quo that they imagine; indeed, it may be
just as likely to endorse the current policy “muddle” as being appropriate to the
broader U.S. interests in China and East Asia.

NOTES

1.	Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea,”
Naval War College Review 71, no. 1 (Winter
2018), pp. 13–32.
2.	Representative of the analytic observation
that other China and regional issues retain
the U.S. government’s priority while appealing for greater attention to the South China
Sea is Ely Ratner in Andrew Erickson et al.,
“China’s Menacing Sandcastles in the South
China Sea,” War on the Rocks, March 2, 2015,
warontherocks.com/.
3.	Brands and Cooper, “Getting Serious,” pp.
16–17.
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4.	The authors cite successful containment of
Chinese interference at Second Thomas Shoal
in 2014 and of an apparent Chinese intent
to conduct land reclamation at Scarborough
Shoal in 2016 following high-level U.S. warnings and commitments to the status quo.
5.	Mischief, Cuarteron, Subi, Fiery Cross,
Gaven, Johnson, and Hughes Reefs in the
Spratly chain, plus the Paracel group to the
north, all were occupied by China prior to
the wave of land reclamation and construction that began in 2013, meaning none were
occupied expressly for that purpose. The
only known subsequent attempt at physical
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occupation and reclamation was the case of
Scarborough Shoal, which the United States
successfully deterred, as Brands and Cooper
note. See “Occupation and Island Building—
China” (China Island Tracker), Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, amti.csis.org/.
6.	For an overview of the Third Offset’s goals
and associated activities, see reporting on remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert
O. Work and the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in Cheryl Pellerin, “Deputy
Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters
America’s Military Deterrence,” DoD News,
October 31, 2016, www.defense.gov/. On the
military component of the rebalance to Asia,
see remarks by the Secretary of Defense in
Ashton Carter, “Remarks on the Next Phase
of the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific”
(speech at the McCain Institute, Arizona State
Univ., Tempe, AZ, April 6, 2015), available at
www.defense.gov/.
7.	Offset is no longer explicit Pentagon policy in
the Trump administration, and some of the
Pentagon offices associated with it apparently
have diminished under the Trump administration; see, for example, Paul McLeary, “The
Pentagon’s Third Offset May Be Dead, but No
One Knows What Comes Next,” FP, December 18, 2017, foreignpolicy.com/. However,
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Trump Secretary of Defense James Mattis
announced at the beginning of his tenure that
any focus on capabilities and modernization
would not come until the Pentagon’s 2019
budget was in place; see Secretary of Defense,
memorandum, “Implementation Guidance
for Budget Directives in the National Security
Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding
the U.S. Armed Forces,” January 31, 2017,
available at media.defense.gov/. The modernization priorities that the Pentagon’s 2019
budget proposal expresses, as well as those of
combatant commanders and service chiefs,
suggest that the technologies and capabilities
that the Third Offset championed, such as
hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence,
and machine-learning integration, remain
relevant. See “FY2019 Budget Proposal,”
Department of Defense, www.defense.gov/.
Also see, for example, “Statement of Admiral
Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command, before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific
Command Posture, 15 March 2018,” United
States Senate Committee on Armed Services,
www.armed-services.senate.gov/.
8.	“National Security Strategy of the United
States of America,” White House, December
2017, pp. 2, 46, www.whitehouse.gov/.
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